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ADMIRALTY-CONTRIBUTORY

NEGLIGENc

-

Rzs ADJUDICATA-

*COMMON LAW JtDGMENT.-A judgment in favor of the defendant, in an
action at law against the owner of a vessel, does not'operate as a bar to
a subsequent proceeding in admiralty against the vessel, unless it appears
that the judgment was based, not upon the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff, but upon the absence of fault upon the part of the'defendant: City of Rome, District Court of the United States, Southern District
of New York, November 21, i891, BROWN, J. (49 Fed. Rep., 392.)H. L. C.
ADMIRALTY-MARITIME LIEN-INsuRANcE PREmIums.-Under the
general maritime law no lien exists upon a vessel for the amount of pre-.
minus due upon a policy of marine insurance issued to the owner of such
vessel: The Hope, District Court of the United States, District of Washngton, February I, 1892, HANFORD, J. (49 Fed. Rep., 279).-H-. L. C.

BANK-INsoLVENcY-SET-oFF-DEPoSITOR.-In a suit by the receiver of an insolvent national bank against the endorser of a promissory
note, held by the bank and maturing after the insolvency thereof, the
defendant may set-off the amount of his deposit in the bank at the timeof its insolvency: Yardley v. Clothier, Circuit Court of United States,
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, January 5, 1892, BUTLER, J. (49 Fed.
Rep., 337.)--. L. C.
BANK-INsOLVENCY OF DEPOSITR-SET-orF.-In a suit against a.
bank, by the assignee of an insolvent, to recover the amount of a deposit
of the insolvent, the bank may set-off the amount of a note held by
them, upon which the insolvent is liable, but which was not due at thetime of the insolvency: Nashville Trust Company v. Fourth National
Bank, Supreme Court of Tennessee, March 8, 1882, PITTS, J. (18 S.W.
Rep., 822).-H. L. C.
CARRIERS-LIEN FOR FREIGHT-MISTAKE IN CHARG.-A railroad
company had hung in its freight office a tariff-sheet of freight rates for
the information of shippers. None of the employees had authority to
give any rates other than those contained in the tariff-sheet. A shipper
asked the freight cashier, in the company's freight office in W., the rate of
freight to B.; the cashier did not know, nor was it his duty to know, the
rate, and asked the way-bill clerk, upon whom such duty devolved. On
account of noise caused by trains, the question was misunderstood, and
the clerk erroneously gave the rate of freight to M. This the shipper
paid, and requested shipment of his goods to B. Shortly afterward the-
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error was discovered, and as the shipper could not be fouhd, the goods
were forwarded to B., with instructions to the agent at B. to hold them for
additional charges based on the correct rate, which was fair and reasonable. Payment of the additional rate was refused, and upon suit brought
against the railroad company for conversion of the goods. Held: That
there was no contract of shipment, as there was no meeting of the minds
of the parties on account of the misunderstanding, and the defendant was
entitled to hold the goods until it received its reasonable charge for transportation : Rowland v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut, August 5, i89i, per TORRENCE, J. (23 Atl. Rep.,
755).-H. N. S.
CoNSTiTuTIoN)LL LAW-AssESSM ENTS FOR LOCAL IuPROvEmENTS
AGAINST PROPERTY BENEFITED -JUDGMENTS AGAINST OWNERS OF.An ordinance of Raleigh provided for the assessments to meet the expense of local improvements upon abutting properties, and that personal
judgments could be rendered against the property owners. Held: That
,the assessments were a valid exercise of the taxing power; but that
allowing a personal judgment against the property owner, subjected
property not benefited by the improvements to be taken and violated
the prohibition against taking property without compensation : Raleigh
v. Peall, Supreme Court of North Carolina, February 16, 1892, SHEPERD,
J. ; MERRIMON, C. J. and DAvIS, J., dissenting as to first proposition (14
Southeastern Rep., 521).-W. W. S.
CONsTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE TAXATION-OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS.-The fact that a city sells to a street railway, for a large sum of
money, the franchise to run street-cars, does not prevent the city, in the
absence of an express stipulation, from subsequently taxing the company
in the form of a gross sum, for a license to run cars : New Orleans City
Cab Co. v. New Orleans, February 29, 1892 ; Mr. Justice GRAY (x43 U. S.,
19 3 ).-W. D. L.
CORPORATIONS-OFFICERS OF-WHEng THEIR KNOWLEDGE IS THE
KNOWLEDGE OF THE CORPORATION-PRomISsoRv NOTE.-Plaintiff, a
bank and an endorsee, sued on a promissory note, as to which defendait,
the maker, had a good defence as against the payee. The person presenting the note was vice-president, a director and member of the discounting
committee of the plaintiff, president of the payee, and knew of the
defence on the note. Held: That his knowledge was not the knowledge
of the bank, as it did not appear that he acted for the bank in the transaction: Commercial Bank of Danville v. Burgoyn, Supreme Court of
North Carolina, SHEPERD, J., February 23, 1892 (14 Southeast. Rep., 623).
- W I. S.
CORPORATIQN -ULTRA VIRES ACT-ESTOPPEL.-The maker of a
note, given to a corporation for money loaned, is estopped from setting up
that the corporation had no power to make the loan : Bond v. Turrell
Cotton Company, Supreme Court of Texas, November 21, i891 ; TARLTOx,
J. (18 Southwest. Rep., 69 1).-H. L. C.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES.

367

CiuMINAr, LAw-ILEGLr, SALZ OF INTOXICATING LIqUOR-Z-VIDENcE OF SAr-SuvFIcimNcy.-In a trial on an indictment for the
illegal sale of intoxicating liquor, a witness for the State testified to
numerous sales by the defendant, but could not fix the date of any sale.
'The Court refused to compel counsel for the State to elect on which particular sale he would demand a conviction. Held : That this was not error:
Sanders v. State, Supreme Court of Georgia, per Curiam, January ii,
1892 (14 Southeast. Rep., 57o).-W. W. S.
DsDrcAroN OF STRUIVs.-The use of a private street by the public
for three years, without objection on-the part of the owner of the fee, is
-sufficient to show a dedioation : Mason v. Sioux Falls, Supreme Court of
South Dakota, Aprils, 1892 (CoRSON, J., 51 Northwestern Reporter, 770).
-I4. A.fcC.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-M.ARTIAE SIZURES-WRIT OF PROHIBITION.-At a time when a diplomatic correspondence-was going on between
the United States and Great Britain, respecting the extent of the jurisdiction of the former in the waters of Behring Sea, a libel in admiralty was
filed in the District Court of Alaska, alleging a seizure by the United
States authorities of a vessel "within the limits of Alaska Territory, and
in the waters thereof and within the civil and judicial District of Alaska,"
for the offence of killing fur seals, in violation of Section 1956, Revised
Statutes. The seizure was effected fifty-nine miles from land. After
the condemnation of the vessel, the owner applied to the Supreme Court
-of the United States for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Alaska Court
from executing its sentence. Leave was granted to file the petition, but.
the Court held, that prohibition will not issue after judgment and
.sentence, unless want of jurisdiction appears on the face of the pro-ceedings, although, before judgment, the Superior Court can examine not
only the process and pleadings technically of record, but also the facts
hnd evidence upon which action was taken; and since, in this case, the
pleadings stated that the seizure was effected "within the limits of
Alaska and the waters thereof," and hence within the jurisdiction of the
Alaska Court, the Supreme Court could not go behind the record to
ascertain any facts which might operate to render .the seizure illegal
because in violation of international law. Held, also, that the writ of
prohibition might, in this case, be rightly refused, because to grant it
would be to review the action. of the political department of the government, upon a question pending between it .and a foreign power, and to
-determine whether the goveriment was right or wrong while negotiations
were still going on: In -e Cooper, Chief Justice FULr R, February 29,
- 1892 (143 U. S., 472).-R. D.
-

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-PROBABLn CAUSE-]VIDENCE. - Iron
-was shipped to a vendee with the understanding that the iron was not to
be removed from the cars until paid for. Through an error, the iron was
-delivered by the railroad before it was paid for, and was used by the
vendee, who allowed the owners of the irQn and their agent to remain in
ignorance of the fact that the iron was no longer on the cars. Vendees
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repeatedly promised to pay for the iron, but never did so. When at last
the owners of the iron learned that the vendees had used it, they caused
their arrest for fraudulently contracting a debt. In an action brought by
the vendees for malicious prosecution. Held: That probable cause for
such prosecution was shown, both by the above facts, and by the fact
that the writ for the plaintiff's arrest was issued by a judge having full
jurisdiction, who, on a subsequent hearing of testimony, ordered plaintiff's commitment: Cooper v. Hart, et at., Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, March 21, 1892, per GREEN, J. (23 Rep., 833).-H. N. S.
NEGLIGENCE-CONFLICT OF LAWS-WHERE THE LAW OF THE
STATE IN WHICH AN ACCIDENT OccURs DIFFERS FROM THE LAW OF
THE STATE WHERE SUIT IS BROUHT.-Plaintiff, an employee of a

railroad company, the defendant, was injured while working in Pennsylvania, where the contract of employment was made, and was to be
executed. He brought a suit for damages in Ohio, where he could have
recovered, though in Pennsylvania he could not have done so. Held:
That under such circumstances he could not recover in Ohio: Alexander
v. Penna. R. R. Co., Supreme Court of Ohio, BRADBURY, J., December
8, i89r (3o Northeast. Rep., 69 ).-W. W. S.
NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY-TRESPASSERS ON THE TRACK OF
COMPANY-WHEN FOR THE JuRY.-Defendant's train
killed a child between 4 and 5 years old on its track. Plaintiff's evidence
tended to show a want of ordinary care on the part of defendant in keeping
a reasonable look-out for obstructions on the track, and that the child
could have been recognized as such for a distance twice that necessary
for stopping the train. Held: That the case should have been left to the
jury. Green v. Ohio River R. R. Co., Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia, HOLT, J., February 12, x892 (14 Southeast. Rep., 465).TV w. S.
A
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